Background Paper on the Egyptian Police and post-Mubarak Recommendations for Restructuring and Reorganization
Prepared by: Dr. Adly Hassanein
International Advisor on Strategic Planning
and Education for Sustainable Development
March 12, 2011
Brief Background on Egyptian Police, Security, Intelligence and Justice Systems Nasser thru 1990[1]
The Nasser and Sadat administrations initiated a number of police and law-enforcement reforms. They strengthened police organization and improved public security. According to official statements, the incidence of serious crimes decreased because of these changes. Nevertheless, the tight political security enforced under Nasser created a police state. Although controls were greatly eased by Sadat, widespread dislike of the police persisted.Egypt's national police had a wide variety of functions and responsibilities. The national police was responsible for maintaining law and order, preventing and detecting crime, supporting the court system through the collection of evidence, and other police duties, including processing passports, screening immigrants, operating prisons, controlling traffic, guarding special events and celebrities, suppressing smuggling and narcotics trafficking, preventing political subversion and sabotage, guarding transport and utility installations, preventing black marketing, and participating in civil defense.
Turkish and French systems influenced the organization of Egypt's police force until the late nineteenth century, when the British modified the system. The national-level police force, set up in 1883, was trained and staffed by British officials and became the basis for the system that was still used in 1990. In 1922, when the British, with reservations, relinquished sovereignty to the Egyptians, the police became a virtual private agency of the monarch, and police administration became even more highly centralized. After the 1952 Revolution (which was supported by the police), all police functions were placed under the direction of the Ministry of Interior.
As of early 1987, the size of the regular police force was reported to be about 122,000; an estimated 40,000 positions were unfilled because police jobs paid poorly and offered few benefits. A typical policeman in 1986 earned between £E60 and £E70 (US$30 to US$35) a month. Salaries in real terms were lower in 1986 than in 1976. According to one Egyptian analysis, police salaries were low in part as a result of excessive allocations of funds for other purposes. The Ministry of Interior's budget had increased 400 percent over an eight-year period, but much of this money was spent on equipment used primarily for controlling riots.
The low salaries encouraged many police officers to accept small bribes (in exchange for overlooking traffic citations, for example) to compensate for their unrealistically low wages. At a higher level, police corruption took the form of complicity in drug smuggling. The creation of law-enforcement bodies within the ministries of supply, transportation, and finance, and within the customs service diminished the authority of the police. According to one source, Egypt had thirty-four separate police forces as of 1986.
Organization
Sadat's administration divided the functions of the police and public security among four deputy ministers of interior. The minister himself retained responsibility for state security investigations and overall organization.
The deputy minister for public security oversaw sections responsible for public safety, travel, emigration, passports, port security, and criminal investigation. Responsibilities assigned to the deputy minister for special police included prison administration, the Central Security Forces, civil defense, police transport, communications, traffic, and tourism. The deputy minister for personnel affairs was responsible for police-training institutions, personnel matters for police and civilian employees, and the Policemen's Sports Association. The deputy minister for administrative and financial affairs had charge of general administration, budgets, supplies, and legal matters.
The commissioned police ranks resembled the ranks in the army. The highest-ranking police officer was a major general and ranks descended only to first lieutenant. Below first lieutenant, however, was the grade known as lieutenant-chief warrant officer, followed by three descending grades of warrant officers. Enlisted police held the grades of master sergeant, sergeant, corporal, and private. Police rank insignia were the same as those used by the army, and uniforms were also similar.
In each governorate (sing. muhafazah; pl., muhafazat), a director of police commanded all police in the jurisdiction and, with the governor, was responsible for maintaining public order. Both the governor (a presidentially appointed figure) and the director of police reported to the Ministry of Interior on all security matters; the governor reported directly to the minister or to a deputy, and the director of police reported to the ministry through regular police channels. In the subdivisions of the governorate, district police commandants had authority and functions that were similar to the director at the governorate level. In urban areas, police had modern facilities and equipment, such as computers and communications equipment. In smaller, more remote villages, police had less sophisticated facilities and equipment.
Training
Almost all commissioned officers were graduates of the Police College at Cairo. All police had to complete a three-month course at the college. The Police College was established in 1896 under British influence. It had developed into a modern institution equipped with laboratory and physical-training facilities. The police force also sent some officers abroad for schooling. From the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, the force sent most of its overseas students to training institutions in the Soviet Union. By the early 1980s, the force starting sending student officers for training in Western countries.The curriculum of the Police College included security administration, criminal investigation, military drills, civil defense, firefighting, forensic medicine, communications, cryptology, first aid, sociology, anatomy, and the French and English languages. Political orientation, public relations, and military subjects (such as infantry and cavalry training), marksmanship, leadership, and field exercises were also included. Graduates of the two-year program received a bachelor of police studies degree and were commissioned first lieutenants. Advanced officer training was given at the college's Institute for Advanced Police Studies, completion of which was required for advancement beyond the rank of lieutenant colonel.
The college conducted its three-month course for enlisted ranks in a military atmosphere but emphasized police methods and techniques. Subject matter regarding the constitution, democracy and good governance, rule of law, anti-corruption, human rights and community service are included or seriously treated in the curriculum of the Police College.
Central Security Forces
About 300,000 members of the paramilitary Central Security Forces (CSF) augmented the police force. The CSF was responsible for guarding public buildings, hotels, strategic sites (such as water and power installations), and foreign embassies. They also helped direct traffic and control crowds. Formed in 1977 to obviate the need to call upon the armed forces to deal with domestic disturbances, the CSF grew rapidly to 100,000 members when Mubarak took office. The government had hoped that the CSF would counterbalance the military's power, but the force never served this function. Poorly educated conscripts from rural areas who failed to meet the standards for army service filled the ranks of the CSF. Officers often treated the conscripts harshly and frequently humiliated them. Conscripts commonly lived in tents and sometimes lacked beds, adequate plumbing, and electricity.The Central Security Forces rioted in 1986 when a rumor spread that their term of service would be extended from three years to four years. They set hotels and nightclubs on fire in the tourist areas of Cairo and near the pyramids at Giza (Al Jizah) and destroyed automobiles. Army units restored order after the rioting had gone on for four days and had spread to other cities. When the uprising ended, hundreds of people were dead or wounded, and about 8,000 CSF conscripts were missing. The CSF as a result dismissed more than 20,000 conscripts.
The minister of interior subsequently promised a series of reforms in the CSF, including a reduction in the number of people to be drafted into the force. He also promised to raise training standards, improve health care, and eliminate illiteracy. He doubled conscripts' wages (which had been lower than the wages of army conscripts) to £E12 a month. Nevertheless, as of 1987, living conditions appeared to have improved only marginally and the size of the force decreased by only 10 percent. The government continued to use the CSF as the main force for dealing with student disturbances, intimidating industrial strikers and peasant demonstrators, and curbing gatherings of Islamic activists.
Egyptian Intelligence Agencies
Intelligence Services
Internal security was the responsibility of three intelligence organizations: General Intelligence, attached to the presidency; Military Intelligence, attached to the Ministry of Defense; and the General Directorate for State Security Investigations (GDSSI), under direct control of the minister of interior. Any of these agencies could undertake investigations of matters pertaining to national security, but the GDSSI was the main organization for domestic security matters. After the Sadat era, the tendency of military intelligence to encroach on civilian security functions had been curbed.Nasser established a pervasive and oppressive internal security apparatus. The security police detained as many as 20,000 political prisoners at a time and discouraged public discussions or meetings that could be construed as unfriendly to the government. The security police recruited local informants to report on the activities and political views of their neighbors. Under Sadat intelligence forces were less obtrusive but still managed to be well informed and effective in monitoring subversives, opposition politicians, and foreigners. The security police's failure to uncover the plot leading to Sadat's assassination tarnished the reputation of the force. The security police also seemed to be taken by surprise by the CSF riots and failed to prevent other disorders such as a series of assassination attempts by radical Islamists in the late 1980s.
The authorities have never revealed the personnel strength of the GDSSI, which played an important role in government by influencing policy decisions and personnel matters. The GDSSI engaged routinely in surveillance of opposition politicians, journalists, political activists, foreign diplomats, and suspected subversives. The GDSSI focused on monitoring underground networks of radical Islamists and probably planted agents in those organizations. According to some sources, the GDSSI had informants in all government departments and public-sector companies, labor unions, political parties, and the news media. The organization was also believed to monitor telephone calls and correspondence by the political opposition and by suspected subversives.
In the past, the regime had given the GDSSI considerable leeway in maintaining political control and using emergency laws to intimidate people suspected of subversion. Under Mubarak the GDSSI remained in 1990 the primary organ for combatting political subversion and controlling all political, economic, social and cultural aspects of life in Egypt. Nobody was able to limit the organization's power when it reached over 100.000 offices and many thousand informers embedded at all levels of the society.
The GDSSI was accused of torturing Islamic extremists to extract confessions. In 1986 forty GDSSI officers went on trial for 422 charges of torture that were brought by Al Jihad defendants. After lengthy legal wrangling, the court absolved all the GDSSI officers in mid-1988. The judgment concluded that the GDSSI had indeed tortured Al Jihad members but said there was insufficient evidence to link the particular GDSSI officers on trial with the torture.
Crime and Punishment
The Judicial System
Egypt based its criminal codes and court operations primarily on British, Italian, and Napoleonic models. Criminal court procedures had been substantially modified by the heritage of Islamic legal and social patterns and the legacy of numerous kinds of courts that formerly existed. The divergent sources and philosophical origins of these laws and the inapplicability of many borrowed Western legal concepts occasioned difficulties in administering Egyptian law. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1950 prescribed the jurisdiction of various courts and provided basic guidance for the conduct of investigations and trial procedures.
The Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups brought demands on the government to adopt Islamic sharia. Government officials argued that adopting Islamic sharia was not necessary because 95 percent of Egypt's laws were already consistent with or derived from Islamic law. In 1985 the People's Assembly rejected demands for the immediate adoption of the sharia but supported a recommendation to review all statutes and change the ones that conflicted with Islamic law. This process, which continued for years, necessitated the review of approximately 6,000 laws and 10,000 peripheral legal acts.
The criminal code listed three main categories of crime: contraventions (minor offenses), misdemeanors (offenses punishable by imprisonment or fines), and felonies (offenses punishable by penal servitude or death). Lower courts handled the majority of the cases that reached adjudication and levied fines in about nine out of ten cases. At their discretion, courts could suspend fines or imprisonment (when a sentence did not exceed one year). At the village level, an umdah (pl., umada, village headman) representing the central authority was responsible for maintaining order. The umdah could also adjudicate some minor offenses and impose short prison sentences.
Capital crimes that carried a possible death sentence included murder, manslaughter occurring in the commission of a felony, arson or the use of explosives that caused death, rape, treason, and endangerment of state security. Few convictions for capital crimes, however, resulted in execution. The Supreme Court, the mufti of Egypt, and the president reviewed each death sentence. In 1987 Egypt executed six individuals for murder and two others for abduction and rape.
The investigation of a crime was a sort of preliminary trial, and the results of the investigation determined the disposition of the case. The Office of the Public Prosecutor, an institution under the Ministry of Justice, conducted investigations. After an investigation with the help of police officials from the district involved, the public prosecutor could decide to drop a case if the charges were not serious enough to warrant a trial.
Egypt's laws required that a detained person be brought before a magistrate and formally charged within forty-eight hours or released. The accused was entitled to post bail and had the right to be defended by legal counsel. Searches could not be conducted without a warrant. Trials were open to the public, but the court could choose to hold all or part of the hearing in camera "in order to preserve public order or morals." According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Egypt's judiciary acted independently and carefully observed constitutional and legal safeguards in arrests and pretrial custody. The Emergency Law of 1958 outlined special judicial procedures for some cases.
The law enabled authorities to circumvent the increasingly independent regular court system in cases where people were charged with endangering state security. The law applied primarily to Islamic radicals but also covered leftists suspected of political violence, drug smugglers, and illegal currency dealers. It also allowed detention of striking workers, pro-Palestinian student demonstrators, and relatives of fugitives.
The Emergency Law of 1958 authorized the judicial system to detain people without charging them or guaranteeing them due process while an investigation was under way. After thirty days, a detainee could petition the State Security Court to review the case. If the court ordered the detainee's release, the minister of interior had fifteen days to object. If the minister overruled the court's decision, the detainee could petition another State Security Court for release after thirty more days. If the second court supported the detainee's petition, it released the detainee. The minister of interior could, however, simply re-arrest the detainee. The government commonly engaged in this practice in cases involving Islamic extremists.
The State Security Courts in the trials they conducted barred secret testimony, upheld defendants' rights to be represented by an attorney, and gave attorneys access to the prosecution's investigations. Trials were usually in public, except in some cases involving political violence. Convicted persons could appeal to the Court of Cassation (see The Judiciary, Civil Rights, and the Rule of Law, Ch. 4). The State Security Courts drew their judges from the ranks of the senior judiciary.
In most cases, detainees were released after a period of interrogation and were never brought to trial. In mid-1989 the minister of interior stated that a total of 12,000 individuals had been detained under the Emergency Law of 1958 during the preceding three years. The minister of interior stated that as of early 1990 the government was detaining 2,411 individuals, 813 of whom were being held on political charges.
In certain instances, civilian suspects could be turned over to military courts for trial on the basis of a presidential order. This practice was the subject of a constitutional challenge initiated in 1989.
In 1980 the government created a separate judicial institution, the Court of Ethics, together with its investigating arm, the Office of the Socialist Prosecutor, to investigate complaints of widespread corruption in government. The court was charged with trying offenses against "socialist values," which included corruption and illegal business practices. The Office of the Socialist Prosecutor served as watchdog against abuses by government officials; approved the credentials of candidates for office in the trade union movement, professional syndicates, and local government councils; and performed security checks on senior government appointees.
The Judiciary, Civil Rights, and the Rule of Law
The Egyptian legal system was built on both the sharia (Islamic law) and the Napoleonic Code introduced during Napoleon Bonaparte's occupation and the subsequent training of Egyptian jurists in France. Until they were abolished in the 1940s, consular courts and mixed courts (of foreign and Egyptian jurists) had jurisdiction over cases involving foreigners. Until the l952 Revolution, there was a separate system of religious courts that applied the law of personal status, ruling in matters of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Sharia courts had jurisdiction over Muslims while the Coptic minority had its own communal courts. Under the republic, religious courts were abolished and their functions transferred to the secular court system, although religious law continued to influence the decisions of these courts, especially in matters of personal status.In 1990 Egypt's court system was otherwise chiefly secular, applying criminal and civil law deriving primarily from the French heritage. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, Muslim political activists had fought with some success to advance the impact of the sharia in adjudication; for example, they were influential in reversing a liberal law of personal status decreed under Sadat that had expanded the rights of women. They also achieved the passage of a constitutional amendment making the sharia in principle the sole source of legislation, a potential ground for ruling unconstitutional a whole corpus of secular law.
Under the Constitution, the executive is prohibited from "interfering" in lawsuits or in the affairs of justice. Judges are appointed for life and cannot be dismissed without serious cause. This provision did not deter Nasser from a wholesale purge of politically hostile judges in the late 1960s, but his action was the exception.
Under Sadat, who sought to replace revolutionary with constitutional legitimacy, the role of the judiciary was largely respected. Although often annoyed by their rulings in political cases, Sadat eschewed any purge of judges and resorted instead to the creation of exceptional courts for political offenses; for its part, the judiciary was able to ensure that a majority of appointees to these courts be trained judges. The presidency, nevertheless, continued to enjoy considerable influence over the judiciary since judicial appointments are a presidential prerogative. Judges were considered functionaries of the Ministry of Justice, which administered and financed the court system. The president headed the Supreme Council of Judicial Organs, which established regulations governing the judiciary.
The base of the court system was made up of district tribunals, single-judge courts with jurisdiction over minor civil and criminal cases. (Minor civil cases involved less than £E250, and minor criminal cases were punished by less than three years' imprisonment.) Over these there was in each governorate at least one tribunal of first instance, which was composed of a presiding judge and two sitting judges. These tribunals of first instance dealt with serious crimes and heard appeals from district courts. Seven higher-level courts of appeals in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Asyut, Mansurah, Ismailia, and Beni Suef were divided into criminal and civil chambers; the former tried certain felonies, and the latter heard appeals against judgments of the tribunals of first instance. The Court of Cassation in Cairo heard petitions on final judgments rendered by the courts of appeals, made on grounds of defective application of the law or violation of due process. It had a president, fifteen vice-presidents, and eighty justices. Alongside these courts of general jurisdiction were special courts, such as labor tribunals and security courts, headed by the Supreme State Security Court, which heard cases involving political and military security. A three-level hierarchy of administrative courts adjudicated administrative disputes among ministries and agencies and was headed by the Council of State. The Office of the Public Prosecutor, headed by the attorney general and staffed by his public prosecutors, supervised the enforcement of criminal law judgments. At the apex of the judiciary was the Supreme Constitutional Court made up of a chief justice and nine justices. It settled disputes between courts and rendered binding interpretations in matters that were grave enough to require conformity of interpretation under the Constitution.
The rule of law expanded in the post-Nasser era, and judges became a vigorous force defending the legal rights of citizens against the state. Nonpolitical personal rights, much restricted under Nasser, were effectively restored under Sadat. It was a sign of the new political climate he fostered that not only were private property rights considered inviolable but also the courts proved zealous in defending the rights of those charged with abuse of public property. Political rights were less secure. In contrast to Nasser, Sadat allowed private criticism of the government, but rights of public assembly were circumscribed by draconian laws against even peaceful protest and the distribution or possession of "subversive"--normally leftist--literature. Although the courts frequently dismissed charges on such offenses, those arrested nevertheless often spent much time in jail.
While Islamic radicals have been regularly subjected to arbitrary arrest, the most dramatic case of the "iron fist" was the 1981 crackdown when Sadat arrested about 1,500 of Egypt's most prominent public figures.
Under Mubarak the independence of the courts and their role in expanding constitutional rights and procedures grew. Courts overturned a ban on the New Wafd Party, threw out the Electoral Law of 1984, and declared unconstitutional a Sadat decree issued in the absence of parliament. Judges expanded the scope of press freedom by dismissing libel suits of government ministers against the opposition press and widened the scope of labor rights by dismissing charges against strikers. But the regime saw fit to ignore a Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that overturned the distribution of certain seats in parliament to the disadvantage of the ruling party. The Ministry of Interior continued to exercise sweeping powers of arrest and detention of dissidents and frequently ignored court decisions.
Incidence of Crime
Ordinary crime, that is, crime unconnected to political dissent or sectarian strife, was perceived to be a major problem during the 1980s, although it was difficult to demonstrate a strong upsurge in criminal activity on the basis of the limited data available. Minor crimes, such as petty theft, pickpocketing, and purse snatching, were widespread in the streets of metropolitan Cairo, but violence in the commission of these crimes was uncommon. In rural areas, crime victims generally sought retribution without going to the authorities, especially in cases where the honor of an individual or a family was tarnished. An informal analysis found that more than half the murder cases in rural areas occurred within the family and commonly involved issues of passion, honor, or vengeance.Reliable official statistics on crime were not available, but an Egyptian report to Interpol, the international police organization, in 1988 recorded 784 murders, 364 serious assaults, 189 morals offenses, and 322 robberies involving violence in 1984. Thefts totaled 19,964, including 1,397 auto thefts but only 14 armed robberies. There were 1,313 cases of fraud and 10,559 drug offenses. The police claimed to have solved more than 90 percent of the major crimes and 75 percent of the thefts. The level of criminal activity reported appeared to be surprisingly low and the success rate in solving crimes unusually high, particularly in light of the belief that urban crime was escalating. The police recorded a total of more than 1,500 infractions of all kinds; presumably this included petty crimes and misdemeanors and such offenses as evasion of price controls.
In an interview in late 1989, the director of security for Cairo attributed higher crime rates to bad economic conditions, high unemployment, population growth, and changes in social norms. In 1988 Cairo experienced sharp increases in the theft of cars and other goods, offenses by women and juveniles, kidnappings, and vice cases. Bank robberies, gang activity, and other violence continued to be uncommon, however.
White-collar crime, smuggling, black marketing in currency, and other economic offenses were rampant and increased under the Sadat and Mubarak regimes. Sadat established special commissions to investigate official corruption. Soon after taking office, Mubarak condemned favoritism and graft and replaced several cabinet members whom he thought were inadequate in their efforts to detect and expose corruption. Nevertheless, economic crimes continued to be widespread. These crimes included embezzlement, tax and customs evasion, illegal currency transactions, smuggling and trading contraband, diversion of subsidized goods, "leakages" from free trade zones, kickbacks, and bribes to officials. In 1986 Egyptian officials arrested about 102,000 individuals for "supply violations," which included petty infringements by shopkeepers and vendors, such as their failure to observe price controls. Some of these violations, however, involved large enterprises engaged in major infractions, often with the connivance of government officials.
Drug Trafficking
The use of narcotics became an increasingly serious problem in Egypt during the 1980s. Some officials estimated that as many as 2 million Egyptians were users of illegal drugs as of 1989. Many of these users were students and children of wealthy parents. Many people used cocaine or heroin, while others used opium or hashish, which Egyptians have commonly smoked for centuries. According to one source, Egypt had about 250,000 heroin addicts in 1988. Police claimed that drug use was spreading at a frightening pace and that the rising cost of narcotics was causing addicts to commit crimes to obtain money for drugs.A large amount of the hashish and opium sold in Egypt was produced domestically. In 1988 and 1989, however, Egyptian authorities seized large shipments of heroin and other drugs that were probably produced in Lebanon and Pakistan. An estimated 300 kilograms of heroin were sold in Egypt in 1988. In 1984 (the latest year for which data were available) an estimated 264,000 kilograms of hashish and 2,000 kilograms of opium were sold. The value of the illegal drugs sold in 1988 was estimated at US$1 billion.
Law-enforcement authorities were more successful in arresting people who sold drugs on the streets--typically owners of kiosks where cigarettes were normally purchased--than major drug dealers, who were apparently able to buy immunity by bribes to high officials. The government had begun punishing drug violations more severely and had proposed subjecting some offenders to the death penalty. Egypt convicted about 3,500 people on charges of narcotics trafficking in 1982. About 2,500 of these individuals received sentences ranging from six months to one year; about 1,000 persons received sentences of five years or less, and 15 received life sentences at hard labor. By 1988 Egypt had imposed much stiffer penalties. A woman from Britain, for example, received a twenty-five-year sentence for smuggling a small amount of heroin into the country.
The Penal System
Prison administration was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. Prison officials were usually graduates of police or military schools. The main categories of penal institutions were penitentiaries, general prisons, district jails, and juvenile reformatories. Criminals receiving heavy sentences were sent to penitentiaries where they faced hard labor and strict discipline. Penitentiaries could subject prisoners to solitary confinement only as a disciplinary measure for bad behavior. General prisons housed offenders who were sentenced to more than three months. District jails usually housed prisoners who were sentenced for up to three months. Village police stations had jail facilities that they used only for temporary incarceration. As of the mid-1980s, Egypt had three major penitentiaries and twenty-seven general prisons.
After the 1952 Revolution, Egypt implemented some reforms in the quality of penal administration. The government built hospitals in major prisons and provided separate facilities for women. Prisons adopted the concept of rehabilitation; juvenile prisoners received special attention; and, in cases of need, provision was made for assisting a prisoner's family.
Egyptian prisons were overcrowded; facilities designed to hold fewer than 20,000 prisoners housed about 30,000. Most of the prisons were built in the early twentieth century and needed complete renovation or replacement. Six prisons were under construction in 1988 in nonresidential areas, where space was available for farming and dairying by convict laborers.
According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1987, prison conditions and treatment varied considerably. Some institutions lacked adequate medical and sanitary facilities. Tora Prison near Cairo, where convicted members of Al Jihad were incarcerated, had a particularly bad reputation. Other prisons provided better living conditions and offered inmates recreational programs and vocational training. In its 1987 report, the Arab Human Rights Organization criticized what it termed "supervision" of the prison system by officers of the GDSSI.
In an interview appearing in a Cairo newspaper in August 1988, then Minister of Interior Zaki Badr acknowledged that "conditions inside the prisons are terrible . . . the prisons are a hotbed of drug and monetary crimes . . . even more so among the guards themselves." He said that the penal system planned to implement modern methods of prison security, improve communication systems among guards, and install electronic closed-circuit television monitoring systems and special measures to ensure efficiency and discipline among prison officers and guards.
According to the 1988 report of the human rights organization Amnesty International, there were many allegations of torture and poor-treatment of detainees, particularly in parts of the Tora Prison complex. Torture was apparently inflicted to obtain confessions in 1987 after a series of assassination attempts against high officials. Egypt has refused to allow representatives from groups such as the Arab Human Rights Organization and the International Red Cross to inspect the country's prisons and meet with prisoners. Members of the People's Assembly who represented opposition parties were also refused access to the prisons. A report by the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights in early 1990 claimed that there was a marked increase in the use of torture in 1989, not only against members of subversive organizations but also against ordinary citizens with no political affiliations. Muhammad Abd al Halim Musa replaced Badr as minister of interior in January 1990. Badr had long been criticized for harsh repression of Islamic extremists and violations of civil liberties. Egyptian human rights activists hoped that his successor would adopt more moderate policies and improve the treatment of prisoners.
Current Events post January 25 Revolution
As reported in the Egyptian and world press during the revolution, police stations throughout the country were torched, dozens of police trucks were burned with protesters stealing firearms and ammunition and setting some jailed suspects free. One month later the streets remain empty of the ubiquitous police who fear retaliation from the populace. In at least once instance in Cairo, a citizen left his car to verbally and physically attack a police officer that was directing traffic. Unable or unwilling to defend himself against his attacker, citizens standing nearby came to the officer’s rescue. More than 30 years of abuse at the hands of a corrupt police system has left many citizens angry and mistrusting of the selfsame police who are meant to protect them. The internal security apparatus fared no better, with thousands of Egyptians around the country storming the agency's main headquarters and other offices and seizing documents to keep them from being destroyed to hide evidence of human rights abuses.
One of the main challenges facing the newly appointed Interior Minister, Mansour El Essawy, will be redeploying the police force, which largely disintegrated in the early days of the uprising and is tarnished by a reputation for brutality and corruption. El Essawy vowed on Sunday February 6, 2011, that he would work to improve the image of the police force and shrink the role of the state security apparatus, hated by many Egyptians even more so after their conduct during the demonstrations.
The role of International Partners in a Post-Mubarak Egypt
There is a role for Egypt’s international partners in supporting the transformation of the country’s police and security institutions and systems. As President Barack Obama stated in May 2010 as part of his National Security Strategy, “Proactively investing in stronger societies and human welfare is far more effective and efficient than responding after state collapse. The United States must improve its capability to strengthen the security of states at risk of conflict and violence. We will undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces to guarantee internal security, defend against external threats, and promote regional security and respect for human rights and the rule of law. We will also continue to strengthen the administrative and oversight capability of civilian security sector institutions, and the effectiveness of criminal justice.”
It has been said that the first duty of government is to protect its citizens. People everywhere seek the peace of mind that only comes when there is good reason to believe that they, their families and their possessions are reasonably safe. In Egypt during Mubarak’s regime, people feared the police as much as they did the criminals. In the absence of a secure environment, neither people nor democracy prospered. In the aftermath of the January 25 Revolution, religious conflict has flared, theft and robberies have increased, and classrooms are empty as parents worry about their children’s safety at school.
In informal assessment of articles appearing in the Egyptian press, on televised news and talk shows, and conversations on the street and in cafes during the past few months would conclude that Egyptians of all classes and education levels urgently desire to live in a civilian state founded on internationally recognized democratic principles that respects and upholds Egyptian social and cultural values. The population recognizes that at the foundation of this new democratic structure will be a system that protects the safety and security of its citizens and the country. The return of the police to the streets of the cities and towns is imperative, but not at any price. Mistrust must be transformed over time and the police, as an institution, must gain the respect of the people.
Recommendations
This situation provides an opportunity for bilateral and multilateral organizations to expand its democracy and governance programs to introduce short, medium and long-term activities and actions that will assist Egypt to build an integrated and responsive police and security institutions. Below are a number of suggestions that could be adopted by civil society organizations to address immediate needs under a grant mechanism.
Following these general suggestions is a lengthier proposal to consider the introduction of community policing into the yet-to-be established platform of the new Ministry of Interior, along with documentation of USAID precedence for such activity.
Egyptians are a peaceful people and if done in the right way, they can be forgiving. A Reconciliation Action Plan should be introduced.
There is an urgent need to heal the wounds in the heart of the Egyptian people caused by decades of abusive behavior by the police. The first step in healing the nation would be the acknowledgement of past wrongs and an issuance of a formal apology to the nation, its youth and its martyrs by a senior interior official that would be aired nationally
Religious leaders can play an important role in the reconciliation process between the police and the population. A “Reconciliation Friday / Sunday” could be organized during which religious leaders can craft their sermon in order to bring people together and preach the values of mutual respect, forgiveness and peace building between the police and the citizens. This action, if sustained or reinforced, will help in preparing communities to accept and engage in community policing activities.
Police in Egypt have long been denied their own Police Association or Police Syndicate through which they had a voice in lobbying for better pay, better working conditions or improved social status. Being granted the right to seek better conditions and pay may help raise their social status, allow them to focus on law enforcement and alleviate their reliance on baksheesh and bribery in order to survive.
There is a lack of understanding on the part of both the police and the citizenry about the new slogan “police at the service of the people”. Questions abound: does it mean the people can boss around the police? Does it mean the police have a diminished role in the eyes of the populace? How does the old order make the leap to be “at the service of the people” without backsliding into their old behavior patterns?
The government should take a two-pronged approach: one to educate the public and the other to educate the police. Refresher and new courses at the police academy should explain to police and new recruits, what it means to protect the nation’s interests and security – not the regime’s. Should be an educational course or manual that explains what it means to protect the nation’s interest and serving the people from the side of the police and the citizenry. The course should define the role of the police vis-à-vis society and its citizens, discuss the importance of respecting and trusting the population and introduce police accountability for their actions.
Meanwhile the government should launch a public information campaign using all available media channels, particularly new media, to educate the population about changes in the approach of the police, the importance of respecting the role and function of the police in upholding the rule of law, and explaining that bribery should not be used as a means of avoiding responsibility for illegal behavior or currying favor.
A review of the criminal justice system regarding citizen rights, incarceration, access to justice, representation, etc., should be reviewed to reflect the new democratic state. The rule of law should be enforced in the new constitution. Citizens should be treated properly under the law and be granted access to representation.
According to a study conducted by the Ministry of Higher Education, the number of law students in Egypt reached 244,000 in 2009. Alumni of the law faculties now rank high among jobless graduates. There is a window of opportunity to tap these unemployed lawyers in the service of their country, by providing all citizens regardless of their economic means, with representation before a court of law and in the presence of the police.
5. Retrain the police to assume new roles, differentiate between the various police functions and provide police with proper training for their functions
Police serving in different sectors should have different uniforms to help the public differentiate their roles. Traffic police should be properly trained to direct the traffic and be deployed in numbers sufficient to make an impact and have working communication equipment to coordinate with other traffic officers. Traffic police will have to gain the trust of the country’s drivers as most people think they are there to create traffic problems and collect bribes. Again, a public information campaign to educate the citizenry to respect the rules of the road and the role of the traffic police is important.
Police can be assigned to neighborhoods to assist directing traffic near schools and as school crossings guards. Deploying police near schools would help to establish a favorable relationship between the community and the police as well as educate young children about the role and importance of the police.
An active police presence may also help to decrease the incidence of accidents involving young children and their parents crossing busy roads.
Tourism police, differentiated by their own uniforms, who take courses in Egyptian cultural heritage sites and foreign languages in addition to standard courses at the police academy, could be deployed to guard Egypt’s heritage and antiquities sites. By learning the value of the sites they are employed to protect they will be a value added to the tourism industry.
The January 25 Revolution demonstrated the active role women are ready to take in the political life of the country. The police as an institution should open up to women and provide training to both men and women in the gender equality within the law enforcement field.
In Egypt many functions that require permits, licensing and or registration take place at local police stations. Every civilian service was overseen by a high ranking police officer. From renewing drivers’ licenses to obtaining a passport police have been involved, with information passed along to the state security. In addition, at each step of the way contact with police required a bribe if services were to be rendered.
A greater reliance on E-government services will decrease opportunities for corruption at the hands of police and government bureaucrats. Youth who are computer savvy may be employed to design, operate or troubleshoot these services.
7. Create a solid internal affairs structure that looks into corruption of the police and state security forces
Prior to establishing an internal affairs structure, the new government must realize that many faces associated with the old regime will remain on active duty with the police. It is important to retrain and reassign these individuals and to limit their interaction with the public if their visibility would hinder trust building but their experience would facilitate the transition to a new policing system.
8. Introduce community policing or Civilian Police as an integral part of the post-Mubarak ministries of interior and justice as part of the longer-term reconstruction and peace building efforts
Why Engage Civilian Police in Egypt?
For the average citizen, civilian police are the most visible symbol of government and an indicator of quality of governance. The relationship between civilian police and the community almost always mirrors the overall relationship between the citizenry and its government. Civilian police action, conduct and reputation tend to reflect on the ability of the entire justice system and, indeed, of the entire government, to carry out its functions effectively.
Opinions about governmental legitimacy are also heavily influenced by either civilian police action or inaction. Where the civilian police prey on the citizenry, engage in illicit or criminal activity, or abuse their authority, citizens lose confidence not only in the civilian police but also in the government that is supposed to protect them. This statement could be said to describe the state of the relationship between the citizenry and police in Egypt both before January 25, 2011 and after.
Access to justice for crime victims generally starts with the civilian police. Improving access is just one commonality between rule of law, governance, civil society assistance and civilian police development. The Egyptian Government should adopt a Strategic Framework that outlines five essential elements of the rule of law as a basis for democratic legal authority: a) order and security, b) legitimacy, c) checks and balances, d) fairness and e) effective application of the law. The role of civilian police underpins each rule of law element. Egypt’s considerable body of justice sector experience, including working with courts, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, professional legal associations and citizen groups can be applied in the law enforcement arena to create a more comprehensive rule of law approach that addresses crime and civilian police assistance in a prevention/intervention and enforcement context.
Since security is a pre-condition for sustainable development, other sectors, such as agriculture or health, can also benefit from improved law enforcement. If farmers cannot sell their crops because of robberies along the market route, a competent civilian police organization should be able to identify, analyze and act on the problem to open up the area for less risky transit. Likewise, populations in high crime areas are typically commercially underserved. Businesses are reluctant to invest in areas that have a reputation for serious crime. Civilian police should be able to reduce the risk of victimization and encourage business to expand. A somewhat less obvious but important example can be found in the nexus between gender-based violence prevention and prosecution. Civilian police also have a role in identifying families that would benefit from social service prevention/intervention services and securing the environment so services can be delivered to reduce the likelihood of gender-based and family violence.
As part of “keeping the peace” civilian police should overlap on a daily basis with civil society, social services, schools, religious institutions and other community cornerstones to address issues ranging from street crime to human rights to neighborhood safety. In fact, one of the ultimate objectives of civilian police reform should be to create an agency capable of preventing crime and disorder. This requires civilian police to play the role of an objective third party, capable of credible intervention or prevention of ethnic or religious violence. Developing this capacity in Egypt will require change on a grand scale.
To guide the Government involvement and programming in civilian law enforcement in Egypt, decision makers should refer to The Field Guide for Democracy and Governance Officers: Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement in Developing Countries. The guide establishes the importance of public safety as a cornerstone of successful development. It is designed to provide practical advice for planners, administrators and field staff involved in the development of institutions of public safety. It provides detailed analysis of management problems in the field, with particular attention to the obstacles that must be overcome in host police agencies and discusses risks to donors and host countries in collaborating in law-enforcement development and suggests how the risks can be minimized. It highlights the importance of assessing conditions prior to formulating assistance plans, of being nimble in management so implementation can be adjusted as conditions change, and of obtaining buy-in among political elites, key bureaucratic stake-holders and civil society.
The field-guide pays particular attention to the critical importance of creating positive "feedback loops" between host police and population. It observes wisely, "Policing is an expensive government function. Personnel, vehicles and stations all cost a great deal of money. A respectful attitude, on the other hand, doesn't cost a thing." In post-Mubarak Egypt creating a climate of respect between the civilian population and the police will be critical to establishing a new police structure within the national security system.
A key issue in restoring safety and security among the population is redeploying the police into an environment where the normal order has been abandoned yet a new order has not been established. This uncertainty is coupled with the dual mistrust for the police under Mubarak and the knowledge that police are required to monitor and address crime. This is the predicament the interim Egyptian government faces one month after the collapse of the Mubarak regime.
In order to build trust in the police as an institution at the service of the people, steps should be taken system wide that will result in a fully integrated approach that, in addition to the traditional reactive role of police, includes a vital proactive element, community policing.
In the interim and at the local level it is suggested that a community policing approach be adopted that will bring law enforcement personnel and citizens together to identify crime and its related problems within the local context of the community. Community policing is both a philosophy (a way of thinking) and an organizational strategy (a way to carry out the philosophy) that allows the police and community members to work closely together in creative ways. At the center of community policing are three essential and complementary core components:
With the introduction of community policing the new relationship between the police and the citizens they serve, offers hope of encouraging mutual accountability and respect. Citizens are given the power and responsibility to resolve more minor concerns as law enforcement teams with them on long-term solutions to major problems. Community policing recognizes that the police cannot impose order on the community from the outside, but that people must be encouraged to think of the police as a resource for meeting local needs and priorities as they change over time.
Community-oriented police officers are empowered with the autonomy and freedom to act as needed in order to implement and participate in community-based problem solving efforts. Officers work closely with other organizations and community groups to educate community members about potential hazards they may encounter and how to:
Successful community policing programs tend to share a number of guiding principles. First, these programs agree that the effectiveness of policing can be enhanced by the active participation of citizens. Specifically, it is believed that these programs will allow community members to become additional "eyes and ears" for the police and, in turn, aid in the prevention and detection of crime. In light of the demonstrated willingness of Egyptian citizens to step in and defend their neighborhoods during the January 25 Revolution, it is clear that the sense of community that existed in Egyptian society before the 1952 Revolution is latent in society and ready to be tapped. Men from all walks of life banded together to form impromptu neighborhood watch groups in immediate response to the disappearance of the police, the mass release of prisoners and the emergence of armed thugs roaming the streets. Youth were a vital part of the neighborhood watch groups.
Second, these programs are united in the belief that effective community-policing programs can positively impact community perceptions of crime. For example, police agencies today recognize that community perceptions (or beliefs) about crime rates are just as important as the actual crime rates when evaluating fear of crime. As such, community policing programs acknowledge that encouraging a more active collaboration between the police and a community is likely to culminate in community members feeling safer--even if actual crime rates do not decrease significantly.
Community policing relies on active community involvement. As an approach it recognizes that community involvement gives new dimension to crime- control activities. While police continue to handle crime fighting and law enforcement responsibilities, the police and community work together to modify conditions that can encourage criminal behavior. The resources available within communities allow for an expanded focus on crime-prevention activities. The public should play a role in prioritizing public safety problems. In the aftermath of the January 25 Revolution led by Egyptian youth, there is an overwhelming sense of national pride and energy to be engaged in civil society. Youth are spearheading neighborhood associations, organizing neighborhood clean up campaigns, and actively looking for ways of participating in the social and political life of their country; they are inviting adults to participate with them.
Community policing programs represent a modern belief that the police are part of a larger picture with regard to the issue of crime and should not be viewed as a separate entity from other justice agencies such as community-based programs, the courts, and corrections. At this moment in Egypt’s history when the organization, functions and practices of the ministries of interior and justice are under review, it is timely to include policing and community policing as a vital component of a more holistic social justice approach to crime.
Dr. Adly Hassanein
[1] The following background information regarding Egypt was taken from The Library of Congress Country Studies and the CIA World Factbook. No claims are made regarding the accuracy of Egypt Police information contained here. Data as of 1990.
No comments:
Post a Comment