Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Local Governance and Decentralization in the MENA Region

Local Governance and Decentralization in the MENA Region

This text was authored by Sylvia I. Bergh and It can be found on http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/Bergh_decentralisation_en.pdf.
The reference is Bergh, S. (2010). Decentralisation and Local Governance in the MENA Region. Med. Mediterranean Yearbook, 2010(January), 253-258. 

 
Courtesy of Dr. Adly Hassanein

In most MENA countries, the establishment of municipalities dates back to the Ottoman Empire and colonial administrations. However, analysts and policy makers have until recently paid only limited attention to decentralization and local governance issues in the MENA region. This is because they have focused on the authoritarian nature of the regimes and on developments with regard to politics and “democratization” at the national level. However, over the past few years, a gradual shift in decision-making power from the national (central) level to sub-national levels has taken place in many countries in the region.

Although decentralization is still viewed mainly as an administrative technique (amounting to de-concentration rather than devolution) and not as a political process, the conduct of local elections and reforms in the legal framework governing cities and municipalities is slowly changing this perception. The importance of sub-national governments has been further highlighted in the context of Euro-Mediterranean decentralized cooperation. Following the Euro-Med Forum of Cities and Regions held in Barcelona in November 2005, a joint declaration was adopted that stated that local and regional authorities have a crucial role to play in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and should participate in the definition of future strategic policies.

In that same declaration, it was decided to create a standing forum of Local and Regional Authorities in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Committee of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) were put in charge of its organization, and the first Forum of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean was held in Marseilles in June 2008. The Forum was attended by 500 participants from thirty countries, including 130 elected officials. The Institute de la Mediterranean in Marseilles prepared a report entitled local and Regional Authorities in the New Mediterranean Governance analyzing territorial policies in the eastern and southern Mediterranean and the role of local and regional authorities in the Mediterranean project.

Additionally, the Decentralization and Local Self-Government Committee of UCLG, presided by the Provincial Government (Diputacio) of Barcelona, seized the occasion
to prepare a synthesis for the Mediterranean of the first GOLD World Report on Decentralization  and Local Democracy.

The major question for political analysts is whether recent local governance reforms in the MENA region really amount to increased authority and autonomy for local institutions, leading to greater local democracy, or whether they should rather be seen as part of an “upgrading of authoritarianism,” i.e. cosmetic reforms aimed at promoting the regimes’ image vis-à-vis European partners while in fact maintaining, if not strengthening, the governments’ hold on power and control over societies.



This article argues the latter view and aims to give a concise overview of the most important developments, mainly with regard to local responsibilities, central local relationships, local financial autonomy and management capacity. The article also critically discusses the state of local democracy and recent local governance innovations in the region.

The Challenge of Rapid Urbanization and Changes in Territorial Organization

Decentralization reforms in the MENA region should be seen in the context of rapid urbanization. The region has seen an average annual urban growth rate of 4% in the past two decades. The urban share of the total population grew from 48% in 1980 to close to 60% in 2000, and it is expected to exceed 70% by 2015 (against an average of 54% for all developing countries).

The “ urbanization of poverty” accompanying the region’s rapid urbanization is adding enormous pressure on cities to deliver infrastructure, services, housing and jobs to meet the growing demands and needs of the urban poor. In several countries, large metropolitan areas (e.g. Amman) have therefore been granted special legal status to improve urban planning. City development strategies have been successfully formulated with Cities Alliance Program funding and World Bank technical assistance and are now under implementation in Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and Lebanon.

At the national level, recent reforms have brought about changes in the territorial organization of several MENA countries, for example by creating regions in Jordan and Morocco (see Table 22 for an overview). Such changes are accompanied by the decentralization of certain responsibilities from central government agencies to regional, provincial and local authorities.

However, these reforms have been counterbalanced by measures that in fact increase the power of supervision by centrally appointed government representatives. For example, the provincial governors (walis) in Algeria received increased powers in 2005, and the wilaya, which was previously regarded as a local authority, was turned into a de-concentrated administrative district. This contrasts with the example of Turkey, where the desire to gain membership in the European Union has contributed to recent legal reforms (2004-2006) that have lightened central government supervision by eliminating the Provincial Administrator’s control over the budgets and deliberations of local councils.

 
 Local Government Responsibilities and Central-Local Relationships

In general, the central governments in MENA countries retain substantial powers to intervene in local affairs, mainly through the position of governors who are appointed by the Minister of the Interior or Municipal Affairs (or directly by the Head of State, such as the King in the monarchies of Jordan and Morocco, or by the President). The provincial or regional level institutions are often hybrid structures, i.e. they are at the same time decentralized local authorities (with elected assemblies) and de-concentrated administrative units of the Ministry of the Interior.

The governors are frequently heading both bodies and are the legal trustees (or guardians) of the local municipalities with a priori and/or a posteriori control over municipal-level decisions and budgets (though the Minister of Finance or an Audit Office often also needs to approve local budgets). Another example of central-level control can be found in Jordan, where the Minister of Municipal Affairs is entitled to appoint a Municipal Director General to work alongside the Mayor and be responsible for the day-to-day administration and management of the municipality.

In official discourse, such high levels of supervision are justified by referring to the need for national security and law and order, especially with reference to the threat of Islamist activists or the danger of the disintegration of national entities (e.g. demands for autonomy of Kurdish regions in Syria and Turkey).

Local government responsibilities enshrined in the constitution and other laws typically include urban planning, issuing building and construction permits, managing public markets and spaces, public health, water, electricity, sewerage and solid waste disposal, sports and cultural institutions, public hygiene, food safety, and maintenance of cemeteries. The legal framework is, however, often unclear, referring to vaguely defined “local affairs,” which, in turn, refer only to residual responsibilities, dependent on the goodwill of central authorities, or on the other hand could be taken to encompass the whole gamut of local services, for which the local financial resources are insufficient (see below). The vagueness of the laws (and absence of statutory instruments for their implementation) also creates overlapping areas of responsibility in many fields, which are then used by the central government to retain most of the powers.



Similarly, some changes in laws governing municipalities have actually reduced the number of responsibilities given previously to local governments and essential to local governance (such as water, electricity, sewerage, local transport, health and education) and transferred them (back) to other central government agencies. In practice, therefore, local governments are often limited to providing rubbish collection and public lighting and maintaining roads and sewerages.

Apart from by central government ministries such as the Ministry of the Interior, local authorities are also de facto restricted in their autonomy by the de-concentrated (regional, provincial) representations of the line ministries such as Agriculture, Public Works, Education and Health.

These bodies often implement their national, centrally-designed sectoral policies and programs on the territories of municipalities without regard for local development priorities and plans and without adequate coordination and consultation. However, a new generation of national territorial planning tools (especially in the Maghreb countries) is more inclusive of local actors. In Lebanon and Jordan, local authorities have also been involved in preparing legislation on municipal waste management. In short, central authorities de facto determine local development plans and funding levels, though promising bottom-up planning reforms are currently underway.

The Potential of Joint Service Provision:
The Private Sector, Civil Society and Unions of Local Authorities

As part of ongoing neo-liberal reforms, some of the responsibilities previously assigned to municipalities (e.g. water and electricity provision) have been taken over by private national and multinational companies through delegation, licensing and public-private partnerships.

However, in virtually all cases, the private providers are under contract to the state rather than to local authorities. Similarly, the legal framework in many countries has been amended to include the possibility of cooperation between local governments and civil society organizations in service provision. However, given that civil society in many MENA countries lacks mobilization capacity and experience, its role in joint service provision has been limited so far.


As for local government associations, they have proliferated at both national and international levels, but they do not yet work very effectively as lobbies in putting forward demands for greater local autonomy towards central governments. However, the number of unions of local authorities for joint service provision is increasing steadily in some countries, such as Turkey.


Limited Local Financial Autonomy
Although accurate and up-to-date data is difficult to obtain, it is clear that local governments suffer from severe shortcomings in local finances in most MENA countries. Whereas the local government share of public expenditure represents 20% of GDP in OECD countries, such expenditure averages only about 5% of GDP in the Arab countries.

For example, in Jordan, the total budget for all 99 municipalities amounted to $161 million in 2006. This explains municipalities’ inability to adequately pay their employees and the dominance of salaries as a share of total expenditure to the detriment of (productive) capital investments. The main sources of finance for municipalities are transfers from the central government (such as a share of national VAT revenues), rental and tax revenues from municipal real estate, tax on property ownership, and taxes on industrial, commercial or professional establishments and/or their turnover or wage bill (including hotels).

Other revenues are generated from the issuance of building permits, other licenses and civil registry documents, user charges and fees (e.g. for water and electricity), and subsidies or loans from municipal development funds and banks. Some municipalities, though, receive funds from decentralized cooperation with European municipalities, and others rely on the goodwill of wealthy locals or people living abroad to sponsor grants for schools and health centers, etc.

Most municipalities are unable to (efficiently) collect the taxes and user fees from local residents and businesses and are heavily dependent on central government transfers and subsidies (accounting on average for more than 50% of local government finances). In some countries, these transfers are aimed at reducing spatial inequalities and disparities between local authorities, but in most they are haphazard and arbitrary. Any changes to local tax rates and fees need to be approved by central government authorities. In the absence of sufficient own revenues from taxation, local governments are often highly indebted to state-owned municipal funds or banks.

Mainly due to the inadequate regulatory environment and sub-national government’s lack of autonomy in fiscal decision-making, coupled with poor planning and operating capabilities, sub-national lending by domestic commercial banks, international financial
institutions and other donors is not yet very common (except in the West Bank and Gaza, where foreign aid accounts for 90% of the investment budget of municipalities and villages).

Weak Local Management Capacity

Due to local patronage considerations, electoral politics and nepotism, local governments are in many cases overstaffed, which limits their productivity. The bulk of employees are made up of unskilled labor such as cleaning staff and couriers, and there is a lack of middle management civil servants with technical skills. The educational profiles of elected local councilors are also often inadequate to provide the needed local leadership and strategic vision to promote local development.

However, capacity-building programs (both in terms of human resources training and improving local management) are underway in many countries with the support of UNDP and bilateral donors such as USAID and individual EU Member States. For example, in 2005, a pioneering e-government system to automate delivery of citizen-oriented services was developed in the Moroccan city of Fez and is being rolled out nationally.





Another feature of municipal management has been the lack of long-term investment planning by the municipalities. This is attributed to the lack of expertise in strategic planning on one hand and to the push for political visibility through short-term investments on the other.

The State of Local Democracy

In the majority of MENA countries, local governments are run by councils that have been elected by direct suffrage. The executive (including the mayor) is mostly elected indirectly by the council members, and its powers have been increasing. Participation in local elections, however, is generally low (except for the West Bank and Gaza, see Table 23), reflecting the disaffection of voters and their lack of trust in the integrity and meaningfulness of the elections. Most people vote according to community, tribal, confessional and family affiliations, rather than the political program of the candidate or his/her political party.

Electoral laws are often such that they favor the regime-friendly parties that are in the majority at the national level (e.g. the Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR) in Tunisia dominated the 2005 municipal elections, taking 80% of the seats and the National
Democratic Party in Egypt which won 95% of the seats in 2008). Gerrymandering is also employed to limit the chance that (Islamist) opposition parties gain strategic local council seats and majorities. Central governments also intervene in local elections by prior examination of the candidates, limiting the number of candidates or intervening in the election of the mayor.


Women’s Political Participation

In recent years, women’s political participation in local governance institutions has increased considerably. In the West Bank and Gaza, quotas have been established for the election of female local councilors. In Morocco, additional lists with female candidates were introduced in the 2009 municipal elections, resulting in a women’s share of 12% of all elected councilors. In Tunisia, the CDR party has announced a women’s quota of 30% for its candidates in the municipal elections in 2010, though 26% of all councilors in the 2005-2010 term are already women.



This contrasts with the situation in Algeria, where only 0.73% of municipal councilors during the 2007-2010 terms are women. In Jordan’s 2007 municipal elections, 211 seats were reserved for women, and in Lebanon, there were only 256 female councilors out of 10,668 municipal councilors in 2006. These advances, such as they are, are the results of top-down government decisions, changes in the policies of political parties and pressure from women’s movements. However, much remains to be done to ensure gender equity in local governance institutions and to ensure that women access key decision-making powers.

Local Governance Innovations

The region has witnessed a tremendous growth of participatory approaches to drawing up territorial plans and development strategies (e.g. through the UNDP’s GOLD Maghreb program). The Local Agenda 21 model, created at the environment conference
in Rio in 1992, is also enjoying considerable success, particularly in the Maghreb and Turkey. Such processes rely on mobilizing and integrating local expertise, particularly from universities, government and civil society organizations, thereby giving rise to multi-stakeholder governance.

However, to date, these phenomena have been restricted to occasional, one-off processes and do not enjoy constitutional or legislative recognition. The reach of the “territorialisation of public policy” is often limited by the weakness of local democracy. Most importantly, initiatives which involve opening up public policy and local democracy are often interrupted or stalled before completion by national players who wish to retain a dominant position in the decision-making process. An exception is a new law adopted in 2005 that allows municipalities in Turkey to organize referenda on local
issues at their own initiative.
In general, though, the region still exhibits weak notions of citizenship and lacks transparent and accountable local governance. In the context of traditional authority structures (such as tribally-based village councils), informal power brokers and local
Patron-client relationships, it is questionable to what extent effective local civil society organizations exist that could function as “countervailing powers” vis-avis local governments and perform the roles of watchdogs demanding accountability from local leaders, e.g. through budget-tracking.


Conclusion

Recent decentralization reforms have – at least on paper – devolved more resources and power to local governments, yet their administrative, fiscal and political autonomy remains limited. Decentralization and other local governance reforms should therefore not be interpreted as a marker of government withdrawal, but rather as a tool in the toolbox of (semi-)authoritarian regimes in the MENA region to further extend government control and oversight to the peripheries of society, while outwardly satisfying Western expectations of transitions to democracy.









Bibliography

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by Ben Letaief, Mustapha, et al., “Africa,” p.
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الجمعة, 20 أيار/مايو 2011 16:34 مستقبل الثورات العربية في "البيت الكبير" الجمعة, 20 أيار/مايو 2011 16:34 د. عدلي حسنين يحضر ندوة البيت الكبير تقرير: محمد القليوبي نظمت مؤسسة البيت الكبير الإعلامية ندوة عن المرحلة الانتقالية عقب الثورة والتحول من الديكتاتورية إلى الديمقراطية، حاضرها الدكتور عدلي حسنين المستشار بالأمم المتحدة وخبير التنمية المستدامة على مدة ثلاث ساعات، وحضر الندوة المهندس يحيى الكومي رئيس مجلس إدارة المؤسسة والأستاذ نصر القفاص رئيس تحرير جريدة البيت الكبير ومجموعة من الزملاء الصحفيين العاملين بالمؤسسة وأدارت الندوة مديرة مركز التدريب بالمؤسسة إيمان إمبابي. في البداية وجه الدكتور عدلي شكره للقائمين على هذا المشروع باعتباره نواة للإعلام الجديد، وقال: إننا عشنا تجربة غضب قبل الثورة وتجربة قلق بعد الثورة، وبصرف النظر عن هويتي كخبير في مجال التنمية المستدامة، فالمرحلة الانتقالية بعد الثورات تختلف عن مرحلة الانتقال بعد الحرب، فبعد الحرب نجدد أننا إما أرضية فارغة نبنيها من جديد، وأعطي مثال بليبيا عن أنها مرحلة إعادة بناء نظام ودولة لم تعد موجودة من الأساس، وهو الاختلاف بين هذه الثورة وثورتي تونس ومصر من حيث الموقف الدولي والقرارات المتخذة حيال ثورات مثل الثورة الليبية والسورية أيضا، فنجد أن بشار الأسد هو أول رئيس في العالم تفرض عليه عقوبات دولية وهو نموذج جديد تمامًا عن المتبع سابقًا. م. يحيى الكومي - رئيس مجلس الإدارة وأضاف أن أهم ما يجب التركيز عليه في المرحلة الانتقالية هو الأدوار المتعلقة بالتكنولوجيا والتوعية لمرحلة ما بعد الثورة، وخصوصًا في مصر وتونس لما تملكه هاتان الدولتان من مقومات يمكن بهما التأثير على باقي دول المنطقة وحتى الدول التي لم تقم بها ثورات حتى الآن وذلك عن طريق مايسمى الإعلام الجديد، فمصر أكبر دول العالم من حيث عدد مستخدمي الإنترنت، وعلى الرغم من ذلك فهى متأخرة عن دول كثيرة في هذا المجال، وذلك لوجود حقيقة تقول إن 40% من سكان مصر تحت خط الفقر بما يمنع تعاملهم مع هذا الإعلام وهذا التطور، والتطور التكنولوجي في المجتمع المصري والتونسي كان أسرع من التطور الحضاري المطلوب، كما أنه يسير بسرعة كبيرة. وأشار إلى أن الغالبية العظمى من مجتمعنا ترفض التغيير والتطور وهى الأجيال التي سبقت جيل الثورة، مما يعيق هذا النمو الحضاري الذي يحجم من مخاطر النمو التكنولوجي على المجتمع والفرد. وانتقل دكتور حسنين بالحديث إلى القوانين المنظمة لتكنولوجيا الاتصال، فأوضح أن مصر وقعت على أغلب القوانين الدولية الخاصة بتنظيم عمل الإنترنت داخل البلاد، ومنها قانون ينص على ألا تتدخل الحكومة في شبكة الإنترنت داخل الدولة ولا تتحكم بها بأي شكل، ومع هذا فوجئنا في 25 يناير بقطع الاتصالات عن الشعب ولم يحكم في هذه القضية على مستوى المحاكمات السارية، أو حتى تحويل وزير الاتصالات إلى التحقيق. ويعلق على مسار هذه الفترة قائلا إننا نسير بما يسمى العرف وليس القانون والعرف حاليًا تحول إلى قانون، فمثلا العرف في مصر هو عدم إهانة إمرأة أو قبول إهانة، وهو ما يحدث مع سوزان مبارك حاليًا فتقول أنها ستعيد ما تملكه للدولة في مقابل الإفراج عنها، وأفرض هذا المثل لمعرفة ما إذا كانت المرحلة الانتقالية في طريقها الصحيح أو لا، لذا يجب وضع قوانين واضحة وقوية حتى لا تتزعزع المرحلة الانتقالية في مرحلتها البكر، والمرحلة الانتقالية التي نمر بها مرحلة مائعة جدًا حتى في تونس فيتم القبض على قريب بن على وهو متهم بالكسب غير المشروع واستغلال النفوذ ويتم الحكم عليه بتعاطي المخدرات، وأرغب أن أظهر نتيجة خطيرة جدًا، وهى المؤامرة التي تتعدى التوقعات على الثورتين المصرية والتونسية، وهى مؤامرة من معظم أثرياء الأمة العربية، فمصر عندما تصعد تعود للقمة والريادة من جديد حتى تصبح المثل الذي يحتذى به في المنطقة وهو الخوف النابع من إصابة خلل في المنظومة الخليجية، وعلى إثره تحركت دول الخليج عقب الثورتين لضم دول الممالك من خارج الخليج في المغرب والأردن ولأول مرة تصبح لهم حدود مع إسرائيل. أ. نصر القفاص - رئيس التحرير وعن رأيه في قائد هذه المرحلة فيقول إن المرحلة الانتقالية تحتاج إلى فارس من الدرجة الأولى يستطيع قيادة العمل الدبلوماسي بلا خوف وبخطوات ثابتة، وللأسف عندما جاء هذا الفارس رحل في ظرف 24 ساعة، ويقصد هنا وزير الخارجية السابق نبيل العربي، وتسأل عن القوى التي تقف خلف عزل نبيل العربي عن منصبه، واعتبر أنها لعبة مقصودة لأنه اتخذ إجراءات تعيد توزيع التكتلات في المنطقة، من خلال التعامل مع إيران كدولة مستقلة، بالإضافة لفتح المعابر، وإعادة معاهدة كامب ديفيد إلى طاولة المفاوضات، مما أجبر إسرائيل باستدعاء الجنود الاحتياطي لجيشها وهو الأمر الذي كان يوفر لإسرائيل سنويًا ما يقارب 30 مليار دولار ويكلفها حاليا مليارات مماثلة. ووصف الحكومتين في مصر وتونس قبل الثورة بأنها حكومات يخشى منها الشعب لكن لا تُحترم، والوضع بعد أن اختلف أصبحت الحكومات تُحترم لكن لا تُخشى، وعرض حسنين سؤال عمن سيتولى الحكم في المرحلة الانتقالية التي ستؤثر على مستقبل الدولة لفترة طويلة، ومن يحق له اتخاذ قرارات طويلة الأمد لتحقيق التنمية المستدامة، ولخص الحل في حكومة منتخبة ديمقراطيًا، بالإضافة لعرض المشروعات والقرارات على مجلس الشعب لينظر في إمكانية تنفيذ هذه القرارات من عدمها، لكن ليس من حق الحكومة الانتقالية التدخل في مثل هذه القرارات والموافقة على مشروعات ضخمة مثل ممر التنمية، إلا إذا كانت هذه الحكومة في زعزة المرحلة الانتقالية، فبأي حق تتصرف الحكومة الانتقالية في المخزون النقدي للبلاد لتسديد الديون الخارجية. وانتقل حسنين إلى أهم تحديات هذه المرحلة التي وصفها بالصعبة قائلا: نحن نعاني من أزمة في أنابيب الغاز والسولار، وهى أزمات كانت موجودة، وأحزن عندما أرى رجال الدين وغيرهم من الإعلاميين يقولون أن الدولة تحتاج للإنتاج وعلينا التوقف عن المظاهرات لأن الاقتصاد منهار وهذا خطأ في معالجة أخطاء الماضي، وهذه الأزمات كانت موجودة منذ عهد مبارك ولم ينظر إليها أحد، فهؤلاء عليهم دور تثقيفي للجمهور حتى يفهم عقبات هذه المرحلة، فنحن نقوم بحوار وطني.. والسؤال هنا على ماذا نقوم بحوار من الأساس؟، فنحن نحتاج إلى جمع كافة الطوائف والمرجعيات على طاولة واحدة لوضع إطار عام للدولة الجديدة، وهو ماحدث في مالي وروندا التي تقدمت عن مصر بكتير، وسجلت حوارها الوطني كخطوة معترف بها في الأمم المتحدة لبناء الأسس المستقبلية لبناء الدولة. وعرض تقرير للأمم المتحدة عن نمو الاقتصاد المصري قائلا: إن الأمم المتحدة ذكرت في هذا التقرير أننا نملك نمو بلا وظائف، فمثلا تجد 5 آلاف طالب من الجامعة الأمريكية يصرف عليهم 60 ألف جنيه سنويًا ولا يعمل منهم سوى 10%، فيجب هنا المقارنة بباقي جامعات مصر والنظر لوضعها، ولا بد أن يحاكم النظام على إهدار الثروة البشرية التي تسبب بها، فنسبة الفاقد في مصر سنويًا بسبب بطالة الشباب 40 مليار دولار وهى قوة عمالة غير مستغلة. أ. كامل عبد الفتاح - نائب رئيس التحرير ويقول عن مسمى النمو الاقتصادي لمصر إن النمو الذي لا يعطي أي اهتمام إلا للأغنياء، لذا نجد لمن تستغلهم هذه السياسة بسبب ضعف النقابات العمالية، وهى السمة التي تحلى بها اقتصادنا، وفي ظل غياب ديمقراطية لا يعتبر هذا نمو اقتصادي، وهو نمو اقصادي بلا جذور لأنه مستورد من الخارج. ويضيف أن المرحلة الانتقالية سماتها ثورة الجياع.. لذا يجب تحقيق الاكتفاء الذاتي، وهو ما واجهته مصر بعد هدوء الثورة ليخرج الفقراء على الأحياء الراقية ويسرقون ما بها من متاجر وما إلى ذلك من ممارسات، وهى سمة المرحلة الانتقالية الخطيرة، بأن تكون هناك ثورة جياع، ويجب أن ترتبط مشروعات البلاد التنموية بثقافة الشعب وحضارته، وعرض دكتور عدلي حسنين نتائج إحدى أبحاثه وتوصل منه أن أكبر عنصر ساعد على النمو الاقتصادي السئ هو عنصر الفساد، وأن "مصيبة" مصر الكبرى من هم قائمين على تنفيذ القانون، في إشارة إلى الجهاز الأمني، وقال إننا عانينا من مجموعة من وزراء الداخلية السيئين، وأسوأهم الوزير الحالي لأنه فشل تمامًا في تغطية هذه المرحلة الانتقالية. وعن رؤيته لمتطلبات المرحلة الانتقالية الملائمة لمصر فلخصها في نقطتين هما السياحة والأمن قائلا: إننا نحتاج إلى النظر للتجارب التي سبقتنا على طريقة محمد علي الكبير ورفاعة الطهطاوي لنقل الخبرات من الخارج، فكيف لي أن أترك السياحة التي تعود بمليارت الدولارات شهريًا وأركز فيما هو غير رابح، ولتحقيق هذا علينا بتعزيز العنصر التكميلي للسياحة وهو الأمن، فعلينا فصل شرطة السياحة عن وزارة الداخلية وربطها بوزارة السياحة حتى تعتمد الوزارة على أفراد قادرين على التعامل مع السائحين والآثار، والأزمة الحقيقية أننا نفكر بغرف مغلقة ولا نحتك بأرض الواقع، ومن هنا يجب فرض قوانين تتناسب مع مرحلة الثورة للحفاظ على مكتسبات هذه الثورة، وتكوين مؤتمر وطني حقيقي يساعد في الدفع بتلك العناصر. ونجد أن معظم أجهزة الدولة لا تملك إحصائيات أو أرقام خاصة بوظيفتها، وهو مايجب أن يحاكم من أجله الرئيس المخلوع، والفكر الإصلاحي يجب أن يملك إحصائيات ومعلومات صحيحة، ولا بد من نشر مصر هذه المعلومة، وهنا يجب إقامة أجهزة خاصة بهذا لتعطي الحلول والوقائع الخاصة بالمجتمع. وأضاف أن أهم الطرق لعلاج هذا الأمر هو التعليم، وتفكيرنا يجب أن ينصب إلى كيفية بناء جيل جديد ويأتي هذا من تطبيق علوم القرن 21، ومصر تملك من علماء القرن 21 وعلى رأسهم دكتور زويل، ولا نستطيع أن نتقدم بتعليم كاذب لا يتوافق مع الواقع الذي نعيش فيه. د. عدلي حسنين أ. إشراف شيراز